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Introduction 
The debate on explaining firms' performance by market structures and market behaviour 
in the last three decades showed dubious results. Industrial organization theorists, emerg-
ing as a branch of micro-economics, indicated relationships between market structure and 
market performance. However, the Bain paradigm on Structure, Conduct and Perfor-
mance was could not stand empirical evidence (Scherer, 1980). 
The behaviourists suggested that behaviour variables, such as collusion, pricing strate-
gy, product strategy, efforts on R&D or advertising, could explain performance, measured 
by industry profitability, growth in output, or technological advance, although controver-
sy remained over the interpretation of the findings. Using game theory these scholars 
claim that maximal performance depends on the communication between the market ac-
tors and their intentions. 
The pro-active behaviour of firms is not envisaged in this paradigm, while it is easy to 
suggest that firms in their competition with others affect industry structure and conduct of 
competitors as well. 
The Chicago school economists still question whether the relationship between 
concentration and profits, for example, demonstrates confirmation of the market power or 
efficiency-of-larger-firms hypotheses. 
Nonetheless, the importance of the industry structure for the explanation of the beha-
viour of the firm was accepted widely: 
In formula: 
P = Pi + (P- Pi) 
meaning the profitability of the firm (P) is equal to the profitability of the industry (Pi) 
to which it belongs plus the difference in profitability between the firm and the industry. 
The second part emphasizes the competitive advantage of the firm (Douma, 1993). The 
profitability of the industry depends on the rivalry in the industry, according to Porter 
(1985). He states that five forces influence the industry rivalry. Using Porter's framework 
on the forces driving industry competitiveness, a large number of factors are to be dis-
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Figure 1. Forces driving industry Competition (Porter, 1980) 
cerned that can potentially have an impact on industry competition. The five broad com-
petitive forces provide a context in which all firms in an industry compete (Figure 1). 
Intensive rivalry is the result of numerous or equally balanced competitors, slow indus-
try growth, high fixed costs, lack of differentiation, capacity augmented in large incre-
ments, diverse competitors, high exit barriers and high strategic risks. 
A number of companies operating in the same market can form the basis for intense ri-
valry. The competition among each other to get a share of the market, will press all of 
them to stay ahead. In this way competition among companies will keep them sharp and 
constantly looking for a competitive edge. Thus developments can take place on many as-
pects such as low production costs, better service and innovative products. In this way ri-
valry makes a company aware of its strengths and weaknesses, and develop/improve 
them. Thus it follows that intense rivalry in the domestic market can enhance 
competitiveness in the international field (Porter,1990). 
Following the intensity of rivalry some strategic options may enhance the competitive 
edge of firms further than others. The strategic management perspectives, such as the Por-
ter model, opened new avenues to research to unlock the black box that contains market 
and firm conduct in neoclassical economic theory and the traditional Industrial Organiza-
tion paradigm. 
Adding the richness of strategic choice certainly complicates the theory of the firm but 
allows a much more broader scope of performance and behavioral processes of 
organizations. 
The major hypothesis we address in this paper, is whether the strategic choice is reduced, 
the more concentrated the industry is. This hypothesis is based on the notion that in ma-
ture industries where the concentration is high, the rivalry declines and by that increases 
the profitability of the industry (Scherer, 1980). 
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The profitability is assumed to be the result of strategic decisions taken by the firms. 
Some strategies will contribute more to profitability than others (Brealey and Myers, 
1988). However, all the firms in the industry are left with a rather thorough knowledge of 
the implications of strategies for risks and market value. Hence, the strategic room to ma-
neuver will decline, the more concentrated the industry is. 
In this paper we shall explore the relationship between structure and strategies of seed 
firms in Europe. Specifically, we shall deal with the question what impact the concentrati-
on in the Dutch and Italian seed industry have for the strategies deployed by the seed 
firms in those markets. 
We shall use data from an international research programme on the vegetable seed in-
dustry, conducted by the Department of Management Studies of the Wageningen Agricul-
tural University. These data refer to national studies in Italy, France, Spain, The 
Netherlands, The United Kingdom, Denmark and Hungary. 
The global seed industry 
The vegetable chain 
The figure below visualizes the role the seed sector plays in vegetable production. No 
specific national situation is described here, therefore foreign trade is not taken into ac-
count. 
The figure puts the seed company firmly at the start of the vegetable production chain. 
This implies that the basis of the production and marketing of vegetables is formed by 
seed reproduction. 
Seed Company 
Plant Grower 
Vgt. Grower = d , 
Auction Processing 
Wholesale 
Retail 
Consumer 
Figure 2. The vegetable production chain 
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The chain should also work the other way around. Which means that the basis of the 
breeding programmes of the individual seed companies should lie in consumer preferen-
ces. This type of information trickles up and down the production chain. However seed 
breeding faces a long term production cycle. While consumer preferences are subject to 
swift changes. So the seed sector has to put up with an imperfect response to the informa-
tionflow. 
World vegetable demand and supply 
The following two tables will give a broad idea of what happened in world agriculture 
and horticulture over the past decade. The regions have been divided according to the 
FAO structure. 
In arable farming the world has seen no rise in the total cultivated area. Losses in the 
Developed world have been compensated by reclamations in Africa and Asia. Both in 
area and production volume the power of the Far East is significant. In both areas it takes 
roughly 40% and equals North America, Europe and the USSR combined! 
The production figures of the past decade show astounding growth figures in the Asian 
region. Especially the Far East saw a steep rise in productivity. Africa follows closely 
with rising output figures. In the Developed world, only Europe was able to break the 
doom and gloom.lt shows an overall production increase and a rise in productivity on 
world average. The table also shows that rising production is generally followed by rising 
exports. 
In vegetable production the world saw a handsome 6.6% increase in cultivated area. 
However this was followed by a 26.6% increase in production, mainly instigated by the 
Far East. North America strongly follows the rise in production and even more in produc-
tivity. Oceania has put out even better figures, but fails to make an impact. 
The whole of the developing world show strong growth in vegetable production. 
Growth in area can be found mainly in Africa and the Far East. Where Africa has a lot of 
catching up to do. Both in area and production volume the power of the Far East is signifi-
cant. On 36% of the area, almost half the worlds vegetable production is grown. Thus a 
40% growth rate makes quite an impact on world production figures. 
Table 1 Changes in global arable farming 1981-1991 (%) 
World 
North America 
Europe 
Oceania 
USSR 
Rest Developed 
Africa 
Latin America 
Near East 
Far East 
Rest Developing 
Area 
876,666 
109,739 
74,500 
14,421 
116,745 
8,744 
106,701 
76,137 
44,190 
335,990 
250 
% 
.0 
9.8 
5.6 
12.4 
12.8 
20.0 
26.5 
2.8 
10.2 
1.7 
11.6 
Production 
2,621,499 
416,244 
393,026 
21,068 
238,583 
32,282 
214,087 
185,167 
89,129 
1,057,129 
1,749 
% 
15.8 
0.8 
9.1 
9.6 
6.7 
8.8 
42.8 
15.0 
67.3 
28.7 
14.5 
Import % 
1.1 
73.4 
22.6 
168.0 
12.9 
12.9 
20.3 
6.6 
38.9 
23.6 
62.5 
Export% 
0.4 
15.7 
34.5 
16.5 
82.7 
78.8 
137.3 
11.2 
204.7 
90.5 
69.6 
source: FAO 
area in 1,000 ha; production in 1,000 tonnes 
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Table 2 Changes in global vegetable growing 1981-1991 (%) 
World 
North America 
Europe 
Oceania 
USSR 
Rest Developed 
Africa 
Latin America 
Near East 
Far East 
Rest Developing 
Area 
13,303 
581 
2,010 
52 
1,661 
348 
784 
1,103 
1,936 
4,830 
2 
% 
6.6 
-1.0 
-10.4 
15.6 
-3.7 
-0.3 
38.3 
9.3 
-0.2 
20.1 
0.0 
Production 
452,336 
34,288 
68,530 
2,089 
31,412 
18,076 
19,315 
21,668 
43,715 
212,805 
438 
% 
26.6 
26.0 
8.2 
45.7 
1.7 
2.4 
48.3 
25.4 
25.7 
40.6 
31.1 
Import % 
30.0 
61.8 
31.7 
-97.6 
23.6 
-61.0 
11.5 
16.3 
36.7 
96.7 
7.9 
Export% 
29.8 
18.8 
16.4 
61.2 
— 
38.6 
63.7 
94.2 
45.2 
9.1 
-81.8 
Source: FAO 
import/export of vegetables comprise of tomatoes and onions. 
area in 1,000 ha; production in 1,000 tonnes 
World vegetable trade balance 
Unfortunately the data presented in table 2 only allow general statements as the import-
export figures comprise of tomatoes and onions. Onions are durable and can thus be 
stored during long periods of time or transported over large distances. 
Most other vegetables do not allow for this without conservation in one way or the 
other. Therefore vegetable growing generally takes place around the main consumption 
centres. This restricts foreign trade to a mere regional level, among neighbouring coun-
tries. A higher off-season price would pay for high inputs of technology or transportation 
required by global vegetable trade. In this way Kenia has built a strong position in expor-
ting vegetables to Europe in wintertime. 
Improvements in technology or production of more durable varieties in effect cut down 
the total transportation time to consumption centres. This increase the potential produc-
tion area of this consumption centre, making the world a smaller place as it were. 
European Demand and Supply 
In order to get an idea of the nature of the seed demand it would be wise to take a closer 
look at the state of agriculture in Europe. Table 3 below give a picture of the develop-
ments in the agricultural structure over the past years. One should note that after 1990 the 
former East-Germany is integrated in German statistics. That is why 1990 has been 
chosen as the year of reference. 
Large arable areas can be found in the larger countries. Spain and France supply the lar-
gest areas, followed by Germany, Italy and the UK. A small country like Denmark has a 
remarkably strong position in arable farming. Over the period 85-90 little changed on a 
European scale when the arable areas are considered. The only sizable decline in arable 
area took place in the UK and Denmark. 
The total number of arable farms is the largest is Italy, with an average size of some 7 
hectares. Greece and Portugal have a similar situation. Large scale arable farming tradi-
tionally takes place in the UK, Denmark and France. 
The number of arable farms in Europe show an average annual decline of 2%, whereby 
numbers of Irish farms plunge quite dramatically. Only Greece and the Netherlands have 
152 MANAGEMENT OF AGRI-CHAINS 
STRUCTURE AND STRATEGY 
Table 3 Changes in agricultural structure 1985-90 (%) 
EC-12 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Arable 
Area 
67,371 
711 
2,507 
7,382 
2,925 
15,560 
17,753 
1,029 
8,917 
55 
897 
2,906 
6,589 
Change Holdings 
-0.4 
-4.2 
-4.1 
2.1 
0.0 
-0.6 
1.4 
-6.4 
-1.7 
0.0 
4.9 
0.0 
-5.9 
4,432 
52.5 
76.6 
518.2 
430.9 
668.7 
668.3 
59.9 
1,294.6 
3.1 
62.5 
406.0 
130.6 
Change 
-13.1 
-11.6 
-12.4 
-5.3 
-10.0 
-47.9 
-8.9 
-11.7 
-5.5 
82 
-9.4 
Vegetable 
Area 
1,693 
31 
15 
49 
135 
469 
276 
5 
411 
0 
65 
-2.3 
142 
Change 
0.6 
2.7 
-2.5 
3.5 
-2.0 
0.6 
1.5 
0.0 
-0.6 
-15.1 
0.5 
71.6 
0.8 
Holdings 
1,030 
12.7 
3.1 
25.5 
116.9 
319.3 
85.2 
1.1 
357.7 
0.1 
18.8 
18.0 
Change 
-26.6 
-31.1 
-20.3 
1.9 
-29.2 
-82.0 
-34.1 
-42.9 
-26.6 
-19.6 
source: Eurostat 
Area in 1,000 Ha, number of Holdings in 1,000. 
1% per year drop numbers. When the arable area remains constant, a drop in number of 
holdings means a larger scale of farming. A very small decline or growth, could then 
mean either intensified cultivation or stagnation. 
In vegetables, large areas can be found in Spain and Italy, smaller territories are in 
France, Greece and the UK. Drastic changes in area over the past years have not been tak-
ing place. 
The total number of vegetable producing farms is highest in Spain and Italy, leaving 
Greece the runner up with half the number. The average size of farms differs widely, 
again the large scale farms can be found in the UK, Denmark, France and the Nether-
lands. The southern European countries have a below average scale. 
In the number of holdings a noticeable decline of 4-6% per year on average took place. 
Greece was the only country here to show growth. This would imply a rapidly growing 
scale of production in vegetable production across Europe. 
The total change in production volume in the EC amounts to zero over the five-year 
period. However between productgroups this is hardly the case, as there is no country 
without double digit growth figures. Pulses and oilseeds have benefitted the most, the EC-
agricultural policies of the time would explain a large part of the growth. Within cropping 
plans vast changes can take place rapidly. Therefore the recent agricultural reforms will 
undoubtedly have left their impact on the division of production among productgroups. 
France is easily recognized as the main arable producer within the EC, with Germany 
coming second. Considerable growth takes place in Denmark and the Netherlands. Pro-
ductivity in arable farming is highest is the northern EC-members, foremost the Nether-
lands, and lowest in the south, especially Spain. 
One should note that the Danish Bureau of Statistics stopped collecting horticultural 
data in the years 1990/91. This would explain the "collapse" of the Danish horticultural 
production. 
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Table 4 Changes in arable production volume 1985-90 (%) 
EC-12 
Belgium 
Denmark 
Germany 
Greece 
Spain 
France 
Ireland 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Portugal 
UK 
Volume 
338,862 
11,446 
31,078 
63,431 
8,850 
33,674 
102,703 
4,715 
33,800 
179 
17,428 
2,648 
39,125 
Change 
0.0 
2.3 
46.8 
-4.4 
4.6 
-5.0 
-0.8 
6.0 
9.0 
3.5 
16.7 
-3.0 
-0.2 
Cereals 
-0.9 
-3.8 
20.8 
-0.1 
2.0 
-10.5 
-1.5 
0.7 
-2.6 
12.1 
20.4 
0.9 
0.5 
Pulses 
66.9 
220.0 
5.4 
41.6 
1.7 
-21.6 
225.7 
600.0 
-25.3 
-
-8.8 
0.0 
90.8 
Rootcrops 
2.6 
3.4 
-2.5 
-9.3 
5.5 
0.3 
-9.7 
10.4 
15.7 
-37.5 
16.7 
-9.1 
-6.2 
Oilseed 
52.7 
78.6 
1,556.4 
87.4 
26.3 
42.9 
53.9 
7.1 
295.9 
400.0 
-7.9 
62.1 
40.6 
Adapted from Eurostat 
volume in 1,000 tonnes 
Table 5 Changes in horticulture production volume 1985-90 (%) 
Volume 
EC-12 44,553 
Belgium 1,136 
Denmark 18 
Germany 1,479 
Greece 3,841 
Spain 11,496 
France 5,472 
Ireland 227 
Italy 12,246 
Luxembourg 3 
Netherlands 3,479 
Portugal 2,120 
UK 3,579 
adapted from Eurostat 
volume in 1,000 tonnes 
Change 
1.9 
11.3 
-93.7 
-3.1 
-10.8 
21.0 
-1.2 
3.1 
-6.2 
-13.3 
26.9 
6.9 
1.2 
Cabbage 
-5.4 
-13.8 
-87.6 
-9.8 
11.5 
-1.1 
-17.3 
-15.8 
4.5 
-80.0 
12.3 
1.2 
-5.1 
Leaf 
19.8 
13.0 
-92.6 
12.5 
8.8 
50.0 
5.2 
10.0 
16.8 
-30.0 
12.7 
6.7 
25.8 
Fruitvgt 
-1.9 
57.7 
-32.7 
26.9 
-14.7 
29.2 
-0.4 
-14.0 
-15.3 
— 
31.1 
8.1 
26.2 
Root 
-1.9 
-15.2 
-100.0 
34.3 
2.7 
-5.2 
-7.6 
-0.1 
21.0 
-70.0 
34.8 
-2.1 
-5.9 
Pulses 
-7.3 
-9.1 
-100.0 
-22.7 
-13.5 
-3.9 
-6.4 
-4.3 
-16.3 
— 
-0.3 
-16.7 
-0.1 
Overall vegetable production is stagnant in the EC, nevertheless growth figures differ 
widely among countries. Total growth is highest in the Netherlands and Spain, while 
Greece shows a decline of over 10%. Major producers are Spain and Italy, France coming 
second with half the volume, Greece, UK and the Netherlands complete the picture. 
When volume and area are compared, the Netherlands have a clear productivity lead of 
double the EC-average. 
Among productgroups only among leaf- and stalkvegetables (lettuce, celery, etc) a 
strong growth is shown. Spain and the UK benefitted most from this, while France lagged 
behind in growth. An overall decline is registered in the production of pulses, this is a 
small sector in terms of volume. Other sectors show a diverse picture with strong growth 
and decline. However the best overall performance is given by the Netherlands. In 
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general the southern EC-members have an emphasis on fruitvegetables and leaf-/stalkve-
getables, while the northern states concentrate on cabbage and rootcrops. 
The European seed industry structure 
The structure of an industry can be typified by several indicators: 
degree of collusion or concentration 
product differentiation 
growth of demand 
cost structure 
intensity and size of investments and 
over capacity of production means. 
The first indicator we present here is de demand side of the seed industry. 
Seed demand and supply 
Patterns in demand for seed in general follow production patterns. This is easy to con-
clude, as there will be no production without seed. The demand for vegetable seed on a 
global scale could therefore be derived from the figures of table 3. The problem arising 
here is that crops, varieties, spacing of sowing, productivity and the number of harvests 
per year may differ from one country to another. This means that an estimate of seed de-
mand can hardly be computed from these data. A rule of thumb would be that large pro-
duction areas imply high demand of seed. 
The above will also be true for the EC-countries. Thus Italy and Spain should have the 
highest demand, followed by France, Greece, the Netherlands and the UK. In the figure 
below the production volumes are compared to the value of the vegetable seed markets. 
These values are estimates compiled by LEI-Rabobank in a previous study. 
Figure 3. Vegetable productionvolume and seed value in Europe, 1990 
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The figure shows a striking disparity between volume and value where Greece, Spain 
and to a lesser extent the UK, are concerned. For all three countries the value of the seed 
market has a lower estimate than expected according to production figures. To avoid the 
conclusion that the estimates of the value of the seed market cannot be trusted, it is best to 
assume all figures to be correct. This implicates that the larger part of vegetable producti-
on in Greece and Spain is generated by farmer-saved seed instead of commercial seed. 
This is supported by the results of the Spanish national studies performed in 1993. 
An indication of the supply of vegetable seeds is given by the following figure, showing 
international trade flows. It becomes clear that there are tree major trade centres in world: 
USA, France and the Netherlands. 
These figures are a bit murky as there are sizable re-exports and re-imports. 
Concentration in the seed industry 
A characteristic of the industry structure, we use here, is the degree of concentration. 
Concentration is influenced by two factors: the number of companies in the industry and 
the relative size of the companies. In general it is said, that the less companies and the less 
larger companies, the higher the concentration within the industry. 
Concentration can be measured by various means, like the C4, being the total turnover 
or market share of the four largest companies in the industry, the H(erfindhal)-index or 
the Entropie of Theil-index (E-index). The H- and E-index take into consideration the 
market shares of all the actors in the market. The intercorrelations between the three are 
high (Scherer, 1980). 
In our study we base our findings of the modified C4-indicator. 
Thus one should take a look at the companies in the industry and the estimated turnover 
per company in vegetables. 
If 10 million Guilders turnover in vegetables (4.3 mln ECU) or more is taken a large 
enough size, it is possible to compare rivalry within several countries. 
The table shows strong rivairy can be expected on the French and the Dutch market. 
Taking a closer look at the annex, it follows that 4 companies appear more than 3 times, 
totalling 13 out of 32 appearances. This means that they are large enough to keep up the 
competition at home and abroad. The companies involved: Groupe Limagrain, S&G/San-
doz Seeds, Royal Sluis and Asgrow Seeds. 
The table also indicates that competitive rivalry will show some stability with some 
dominant firms within the domestic markets. This stability occurs in growing markets. 
However, because the slower growth in the domestic markets, as shown before, rivalry 
increases: the firms have committed themselves in keeping up the market shares. In this 
Table 6 Number of large vegetable seed firms and national market value 
Nr of Companies Marketvalue 
Spain 3 32.5 
France 10 86.5 
Italy 7 129.8 
Netherlands 11 69.2 
UK 1 47.6 
market value in million ECU 
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situation conditions prevail for co-operative behaviour, expressed by merger, acquisition 
and alliances. 
In the seed industry in Europe, this concentration process has been going on already for 
about two decades. Some examples: 
Italy 
The intensity of the competition in the seed industry in still increasing in Italy. The most 
important competitors for most of the companies in Italy are: 
- Royal Sluis S.R.L. 
PetoItalianaS.R.L. 
Asgrow Italia S.P.A. 
Sluis&Groot/Sandoz Italia S.P.A. and 
- Clause Italia S.P.A.. 
France 
The major players in the vegetable seed industry in France are Limagrain, Clause (owned 
by Rhone-Paulenc and Orsan), Caillard (owned by Sandoz), Plan, Royal Sluis, GSN 
Semences, Asgrow France, André Blondeau and TOP Semences. 
Limagrain, the largest group in France, was created by successive purchases of well 
known companies, such as Vilmorin (1975) and Tezier in France, Ferry Morse and Ad-
vance Seeds (USA), Flora Frey (Germany) and Nickerson-Zwaan in 1990, that before that 
event participated in the Shell group, that acquired A.R. Zwaan en Zoon in 1973. 
Some other recent developments are the formation of the joint-venture with the Danish 
DLF-Trifolium for fodder-crop seeds (1990), the joint-venture with the co-operative 
Union du Cher on biotechnology, 
Clause has a long-standing position already in the vegetable seed market. 
The take-over by Rhone-Paulenc and Orsan, the growth in the professional market has 
increased rapidly. Acquisitions played a part in this development. 
Asgrow France, owned by Upjohn (USA) bought Bruinsma (The Netherlands) in 1992. 
Petoseed Europe bought van Waveren, a subsidiary from KWS on seeds for vegetables 
for the canning industry. 
Sweden 
In 1993 the two major Swedish companies Svalöf and Weibull merged to enlarge their ef-
forts in, among other businesses, the horticultural industry. 
Spain 
Now, there are 35 companies active in the vegetable seed market. Twelve firms are subsi-
diaries of foreign firms and three are joint-ventures with foreign firms. 
The main Spanish firms are: 
SemillasFito S.A. 
Semillas Battle S.A. 
Intersemillas S.A. and 
R amori Arnedo S.A. 
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Since the 70's and early 80's many foreign seed companies entered the seed market di-
rectly, because of the growth in the vegetable industry. 
Concentration processes have been induced since then by those foreign based firms. 
Petoseed and Clause are the major players in this market. 
The Netherlands 
Structural concentration also took place in The Netherlands. 
A.R. Zwaan en Zoon was established in 1942. 
Cebeco-Handelsraad acquired a majority participation in Rijk Zwaan in 1989. 
As mentioned before, A.R. Zwaan en Zoon, was acquired by Nickerson Seed Special-
ists in Rothwell (U.K.), being a subsidiary of Shell in 1973. Nickerson- Zwaan, the name 
adopted in 1980, took over D.van der Ploeg Seeds in 1981 and Supergran (Belgium) in 
1979. Limagrain took over Nickerson- Zwaan in 1990. 
De Ruiter Zonen, one of the major tomato seed firms, took over Gebr. van den Ploeg in 
the eighties. 
Bejo Zaden is a merger of two companies in 1978: Jacob Jong and C.Beemsterboer, 
both pioneers in open air vegetable seeds. 
Nunhems Zaden was taken over by Hoechst in 1986 to lead the seed division of this 
German chemical conglomerate. 
Rijk Zwaan was taken over in 1986 by the petro-chemical company B.P. Nutrition. 
However, B.P. stepped out the seed business in 1989 and sold Rijk Zwaan to Cebeco-Han-
delsraad. 
Bruinsma, one of the first pioneers in hybrids, was taken over by Asgrow in 1988. 
Sluis&Groot/ Sandoz already has a long history (established since 1887). 
The firm has a rather consistent pattern of autonomous growth for a long time. 
In 1963 the Co-operatieve Zaaizaadvereniging West-Friesland. 
In the eighties some major changes occurred. 
In 1980 the firm was acquired by the Swiss based chemical giant Sandoz. 
After that, the firm developed internationally by take-overs and new ventures. 
Royal Sluis is the second eldest firm, originating from 1868. 
Autonomous growth also in this case is the device for decades. Take-overs are recently 
new and contain some specialist groups, like on tissue-culture. 
Koninklijke VanderHave Group, now involved in onions, rape and grass, 
was established in 1979. 
In 1977 the co-operative Suiker Unie took over the company. VanderHave acquired in 
1990 Leen de Mos, a medium-sized tomato, lettuce and cauliflower expert. 
Considering the number of employees, six firms employ about 80% of all employees of 
the eleven largest firms. 
United Kingdom 
The concentration process had dramatic consequences for the U.K. seed industry. Very 
few firms still remain (Andrews, 1993, in Seed World april). 
The major players: 
Nickerson, being a part of Limagrain. 
According to Market Assessment 1990 Sutton Seeds has a total market share in the 
U.K. market of 39%. Sutton is owned by Svalöv & Weibull. 
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Samuel Yates Ltd. is owned now by Yates Australia. 
Nutting and Sons is now trench owned. 
Sharpes International Ltd. has been acquired by VanderHave Group. 
Considering the major firms in France, Spain, Italy, The Netherlands and United King-
dom, active in vegetable seed, the major five companies Limagrain, S&G/Sandoz, Royal 
Sluis, Nunhem and Clause make out 60.7% of the total turnover in these countries. 
The findings show an overriding concentration process in the European seed theatre. 
Petro-chemical companies were rather active in the take-overs in the seventies and 
eighties. However, some of them pulled out of this business, selling their seed interests to 
larger international seed companies. 
This horizontal integration is slowing down in the nineties. 
This proves the next point, firms with strong domestic competition are likely to perform 
well in the international arena. To keep up the struggle, companies are looking for a wider 
scale of operation to cash in on the efforts that have been put in. This means that interna-
tionalizing is a logic option, a company already knows (and developed) her edge, and can 
stick to it. 
As far as the comparison concerns between the Dutch and Italian seed industry, we may 
conclude that in both cases the industry is highly concentrated. 
Firm's strategies 
Concept of strategy 
Strategy is a coherent, unifying and integrative pattern of decisions as a response to exter-
nal and internal developments to achieve a long-term sustainable advantage over compe-
titors. 
Typology of strategies. 
Competitive advantage is to be measured by the total revenues collected by the buyers' 
payment for the firms' output. Added value is created whenever the buyers' contribution 
exceeds the total cost resulting from the completion of all the activities in the firms' value 
chain. The margin is the difference between the total value generated and the aggregated 
cost of the value activities. The margin directly contributes to the competitive advantage. 
To Porter (1985) two basic ways of achieving competitive advantage are cost leadership 
and differentiation. Cost leadership requires the construction of efficient-scale facilities 
and sustainable cost reducing activities. Differentiation calls for creating something that 
is perceived by customers or clients as being unique by technology, customer service, 
image or other dimensions. Market scope consist of concentrating on a segment or geo-
graphic market. It may be broad or narrow. 
Putting these generic strategies together, Porter emphasizes the importance of the follo-
wing strategies showed in figure 4. 
Going a little bit further we may assume that seed firms will likely be interested in 
value added strategies at a similar or somewhat higher price, if the aim is to get higher 
market share uniqueness in products and services should be perceived by customers/gro-
wers in the relevant market segments, depending on the financial return of the purchase of 
higher priced/higher value added seed the customer/grower may be convinced. On the 
other hand, if the market prices of vegetables stabilizes the grower will not expect a 
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Competitive advantage 
Lower cost Differentiation 
Broad Cost leadership Differentiation 
Market scope 
Narrow Cost focus Differentiation focus 
Figure 4. Generic strategies (Porter, 1985) 
higher return and will look for another more advantageous price/value added clue in his 
purchasing process. 
For the international firm, value added/higher priced strategies are a hard ball game to 
play, because of the specific customer needs in the fragmented or differentiated 
international markets. A Dutch cabbage doing well in Belgium, may not flourish in south-
ern Spain because of different clima-ecological conditions. 
Cost leadership is feasible for most firms to achieve. Experience curve effects can be 
achieved in all firms. Learning to do it better to a lower cost level is feasible for all seed 
firms in principle. However, the competitive advantage becomes marginal if and when all 
firms deploy cost reduction strategies and drive down costs in areas as research and de-
velopment, overhead positions and sales forces. 
The highest possible cost reduction target is close to shut down the firm! 
So are there alternative routes to achieve competitive advantage? 
Yes there are. From a product-market point of view the seed firm may select for the spe-
cific product groups the most suitable strategies (figure 5). 
The seed firm always is able to withdraw from a market, for instance if the value of the 
product-market combination exceeds costs on a permanent basis or if the market changes 
considerably over time, implying hugh risks. For determining whether withdrawal is a 
adequate recipe, the firm deserves cost and market monitoring systems in the first place. 
Some seed firms may partially withdraw from a market by licensing the rights to other 
organizations and/or to specialize on the market of basic seed. This partial withdrawal is 
highly advantageous for instance if market opportunities are crumbled by lack of proprie-
tary rights protection. 
Product 
Present N e w 
Present 
Market 
New 
Figure 5. Product-market strategies 
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Consolidation in growing markets is attractive a strategy because of the expected high 
return low cost consequences. In mature markets consolidation provides strategic 
challenges. In face of the competitors positions, the consolidating firm puts emphasis on 
quality, increasing marketing activity or cost reduction through productivity gains or 
higher capital intensity, which often is hard to achieve in the seed business. In declining 
markets consolidation may require more severe cost reductions and/or increasing market 
share of competitors leaving the market. 
Market penetration in growing markets builds upon the desire to increase market share. 
"Belong to the dominant market players" sets out a device for aggressive market 
penetration in growing markets. To the contrary market penetration in static markets is 
much more difficult to deploy. Market leaders already have established their position, 
preventing others with lower market shares to grow. For low market share players fine 
tuned tactics may do well, for instance by using reputation as niche leader, by allying with 
others to fight dominant complacent market leaders or by using price tactics. 
For seed firms product improvement is connected directly with their basic competence. 
The long enduring process of new product development lacks behind the advantage of 
product improvement. Although also that process is susceptible to time consuming pro-
cesses of testing, registration, multiplication and product introduction. More successful 
product improvement seed firms will tailor their products to market needs, build on the 
firms' core competencies and have organized the processes of product improvement inter-
nally on product management basis. 
Market development builds upon the existing range of products while venturing into 
new markets. Specifically, because of the high capital investments in seed development 
the firms' assets might be specifically devoted to exploit the product by new market 
development. In particular, when existing markets are saturated theses seed firms incline 
to expand businesses in new markets. To the process of internationalization we shall come 
later. 
Diversification brings the firm away from its present products and markets at the same 
time. Still, the diversification may lie within the confines of the firms' competence. The 
direction of diversification may be backward or forwards. Backward diversification is 
well known in the seed industry. Seed merchants having taken over seed breeders. Vice 
versa, forward diversification meaning seed firms acquired merchants. In that sense the 
seed industry showed many examples of vertical integration, being the combination of 
backward and forward diversification. Most seed firms are nowadays engaged in breed-
ing, multiplication and distribution. Still, processes of vertical integration slow down, if 
the transaction costs and experience curve effects lose their positive contribution to the 
firm and negative implications flourish, like growing bureaucracy, less flexibility, higher 
overhead costs and massive inertia. In that stage of industry development new entrants 
may step in and externalization of the vertical integrated firm activities starts up. 
Examples of horizontal integration are also well known in the seed industry. In particu-
lar in the seventies petro-chemical and pharmaceutical companies acquired seed firms, 
because of the expected complementarity between seed technology and seed products on 
the one hand and biotechnology, pesticide and insecticide products and distribution chan-
nels on the other hand. Synergy may be the result of related diversification rooted in tech-
nology, products or marketing and distribution competencies. 
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As we have seen before, acquisitions, mergers and alliances are specific ways of 
supporting strategies. Mergers and acquisitions tend to go in waves. In the seed industry 
the last thirty years these phenomena are widely shown. Mergers are the result of organi-
sations coming together voluntarily on an equal basis, while acquisitions always show 
asymmetry in power, capital or other resources. 
Evident reasons for acquisitions are: cost efficiency by building up economy of scale 
and/or geographical scope, expanding market share by taking over low share value firms, 
entering new markets by piggybacking on the acquired firm or the expanding competence 
because of lack of knowledge or resources internally. 
In the seed industry many of these factors have played a major role in the acquisitions 
in the past and present times. 
Alliances support the firms' strategy in a more open way. Allied firms cooperate to 
share some assets of each of the firms through a mechanism of mutual advantage and 
trust. Examples are alliances in distribution, when firms are distribution capabilities to 
lower costs and share a broader product assortment exposure. Another example is re-
search and development. Seed firms engage in alliances by sharing biotechnology capa-
bilities that each of the individual firm can not permit himself directly. Allying is sharing 
risks and synergy at the same time, without losing the firm identity and autonomy. Licens-
ing, as we have seen before, is a particular expression of an alliance. Giving the right to 
produce seed granted for a fee gives both partners a sustainable advantage. Some forms of 
subcontracting also share the characteristics of the alliance. In the seed industry coating 
of seed for instance is subcontracted to the coating firm on a permanent basis. This may 
lead to far going arrangements in which the seed firm and the coating firm may build up 
competitive advantage over other alliances. 
Summarizing, in this paragraph we have looked at strategic options open to seed firms to 
deploy. There are no arguments yet why this general framework could not fit in the 
strategic arena of the seed industry. 
In this paper we shall now discuss the strategies the Dutch and Italian seed firms have 
adopted and the relative changes of the strategies over time. 
Strategies of Dutch and Italian seed firms 
We asked 11 Dutch firms to the strategies deployed in 1985, 1990 and preferred for 1995 
and 2000. The range of options given to the respondents, were aggregated and ranked (1= 
mentioned often to 5 = mentioned not often). 
Table 7 gives an ample evidence for the emerging drive for customer service. 
The earlier described saturation of the seed market pushes seed firms to improve cus-
tomer relationships on a sustainable basis by a differentiation strategy, containing meth-
ods like better service, higher quality and control and better product image. 
The product innovation drive comes second in the row. Remarkable is the finding that 
increases in the R&D budget are not preferred that much as a strategic method. This 
means that product innovation largely will be built on existing resources, possibly not 
giving that much of an outlook on increased in-depth investments in biotechnology re-
search. 
From a product-market strategic perspective, firms do not perceive stronger drives for 
entering new markets. This, coupled with the former mentioned product strategies, means 
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Table 7 Strategies deployed in 1985 and 1990, and preferred in 1995 and 2000 by Dutch 
seedfirms. 
Strategies of firms 
Durable relations with clients 
Enlarge customer service 
Best service support 
Quality guarantee and control 
Distinguish product from competitor 
Improve product/market image 
Develop new products 
Improve/ renew existing products 
Strive for unique product 
Bigger product assortment 
Product in higher price segments 
Products in lower price segments 
Lowest cost per product unit 
Lower prices than competitors 
Higher R&D expenditures 
Innovate production process 
Enter new markets 
Control production flow 
Enlarge reliability of supply 
Shorten delivering time 
Strong influence on distribution channel 
Innovation of distribution process 
Innovation of marketing instruments 
Adapting of organization structure 
More attention for higher educated 
personnel 
Deployed 
1985 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
3 
2 
4 
4 
2 
4 
4 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
5 
5 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
1990 
2 
2 
3 
2 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
5 
5 
3 
3 
3 
5 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
Preferred 
1995 
2 
2 
2 
2 
1 
1 
2 
3 
1 
3 
2 
5 
3 
5 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
5 
5 
3 
4 
4 
4 
2000 
1 
1 
1 
2 
2 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
5 
3 
5 
4 
3 
4 
4 
3 
5 
4 
3 
4 
5 
4 
that most firms expect to choose for market penetration and product improvement. The-
oretically, not unexpected, taken the development of the seed market. 
Also remarkable is the finding that more emphasis on improvements on internal oper-
ations and logistics is not expected to increase. Cost reduction strategies are not perceived 
as that promising. Cost leadership apparently is not sought for by most firms. 
How does these findings compare with firms in other countries ? 
In our study we focused also on Italy and asked eleven firms, engaged in vegetable 
seed, to rank their strategies deployed in the past and preferred for the future. 
In table 8 we give a ranking of the strategies being deployed in 1985 and 1990 and 
preferred for the year 1995 and 2000. 
The dominant feature of the strategies over time is the increase of customer and market 
orientation of the firms. Customer relation and service, a focus on quality, by using better 
distribution and marketing instruments should give room for higher prices in better mar-
ket segments. This rather ambitious perspective goes hand in hand with smaller product 
assortment and a stabilizing expenditure for R&D. The differentiation strategy is not fo-
cused on the product as such giving the unique dimension to the firm competitive posi-
tion, but on customer relationship, strengthened by value added, service and delivery in 
time. 
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Table 8 Strategies deployed in 1985 and 1990, and preferred in 1995 and 2000 by Ita-
lian seed firms. 
Strategies of firms 
Durable relations with clients 
Products in lower price segments 
Quality guarantee and control 
Improve/ renew existing products 
Develop new products 
Shorten delivering time 
Bigger product assortment 
Distinguish product from competitor 
Control product flow 
Enlarge reliability of supply 
Strive for unique product 
Product in higher price segments 
Improve product/market image 
Enlarge customer service 
Higher R&D expenditures 
Innovate production process 
More attention for higher educated 
personnel 
Strong influence on distribution channel 
Innovation of distribution process 
Innovation of marketing instruments 
Adapting of organization structure 
Enter new markets 
Lowest cost per product unit 
Deployed 
1985 
1 
2 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
5 
4 
4 
4 
4 
4 
1990 
1 
4 
1 
2 
2 
1 
3 
1 
3 
2 
4 
3 
2 
2 
4 
3 
2 
3 
3 
3 
3 
4 
4 
Preferred 
1995 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
2 
4 
1 
1 
1 
4 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
3 
2000 
1 
1 
1 
2 
1 
1 
4 
1 
2 
2 
4 
1 
2 
1 
3 
3 
1 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
2 
Cost leadership does not really get that much of attention now; however the importance 
increases over time according to the preferences of the firms. 
Comparing the findings of the Italian study with the Dutch study reveals a lot of corre-
spondences. Differences concern a stronger Italian emphasis on: 
products in lower price segments 
logistic improvements (delivery time, reliability and product control) 
smaller product assortment 
more attention for higher educated personnel 
new market development. 
Although a comparison should be handled with some necessary care, we incline to the 
idea that the Italian firms also agree on the product differentiation strategy as such, by 
customer service improvements and product development, but also stress the importance 
of strengthening internal factors, like logistics and personnel. Apparently these firms still 
have some room for improvements internally, whether because they rank below the Dutch 
competitors, or because they believe these internal factors are crucial for surviving in the 
business. 
Summarizing, the seed firms, engaged in vegetable seed, in The Netherlands and Italy 
all have a rather thorough perception view on the actual and future seed market. The key-
words are differentiation by a high committment towards customer and market orienta-
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tion. According to many firms this strategy deserves investments in customer service, im-
provement of product quality and control and improvement in distribution and marketing. 
Many firms opt for a smaller product assortment and will invest less in R&D accordingly. 
The attention for cost leadership is less apparent. 
The European integration stimulated many firms to make an European strategy. Dutch 
and Italian firms strive for differentiation and market leadership. Only Dutch firms opt for 
foreign direct investments, apart from increases in exports. Italian firms focus on export 
increases in the first place. 
Structure and strategy in the Dutch and Italian seed industry 
Our findings leave us to conclude that the in the highly concentrated seed industry, a con-
vergence is taken place in the strategies of the seed firms over time. In the past ten years, 
the differences in strategies employed, are evident. However, for the years to come 
strategies of Dutch and Italian seed firms tend to converge, emphasizing the customer re-
lations in the first place. 
According to our findings we face some interesting questions. 
First, if concentration in one geographical market, being The Netherlands and Italy, is 
high, one might theoretically expect a weaker rivalry. The weaker the rivalry the higher 
the profitability, one might assume. This relationship is validated in most American 
studies, although the profitability gains are not reported that high. In other countries these 
findings sometimes are reconfirmed (De Wolf, 1982) or not found, like in Belgium (Jac-
quemine.o., 1980). 
From strategic management point of view, taking into consideration the American 
studies just mentioned, one might hypothesize that the higher the concentration in a geo-
graphical market, the more strategies are focused on increasing market value. This would 
suggest that increases of market value certainly would best be enhanced by the differen-
tiation strategies, supported by relative low investments in R&D. 
One might also expect that high concentration, invites firms external to the industry to 
enter the industry. There is ample evidence that the petro-chemical companies entered the 
seed industry to exploit the high profitability of the industry in the seventies and eighties. 
This, in turn, changed the industry relationships, the contestability and jeopardized the 
co-operative behaviour of the larger companies to maintain the status-quo. On the other 
hand, one might expect, based on the fact that the Dutch and Italian seed market does not 
show off growth, a tougher competition between the few, lasting seed companies. 
This might explain why Italian firms prosper the strategy of lowering cost. 
There is ample of evidence that the increase in concentration in The Netherlands and 
Italy, is due to the expansion strategies employed in the eighties, when the firms enjoyed 
the relative high growth in the vegetable seed market. Due to differentiation advantages 
the Dutch firms contested the Italian firms and achieved in gaining a relative high market 
share. 
In The Netherlands the industry concentration emerged because of other forces, such as 
the higher investment needs of the seed firms. This allowed new entrants to acquire Dutch 
firms. By doing that these new entrants supported the seed firms in their capital needs. 
So, industry concentration in The Netherlands apparently is the result of the technologi-
cal breakthroughs and capital requirements for investments in R&D, while in Italy the 
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concentration is caused merely by the new entrants raping off the profits to be made in the 
italian seed market. 
Evidence for this exploratory hypothesis, can be found in the findings on the strategies 
of the firms. 
Up till now, the seed industry in Italy have achieved a new status quo, with a high con-
centration. The firms adopted strategies that shifted from expansion to further penetra-
tion, using price strategies. 
In The Netherlands the seed industry faces a rather new status quo, with a high concen-
tration. The firms adopted strategies that shifted from high investments in R&D to expan-
sion into new markets. 
The difference between the two situations can be interpreted by the following reason-
ing. 
The take-over of the Italian market by the Dutch firms, is a part of a broader expansion 
strategy of the larger Dutch firms to enter international markets and build up market 
share. The low contestability of the seed market in Italy offered low risks and high gains 
for the Dutch entrants. 
Conclusion and discussion 
The conclusion of this study is that high concentration induces firm to converge their 
strategies. This hypothesis has been validated by comparing the Dutch and Italian seed in-
dustry. 
Strategic choice behaviour apparently, is not merely a function of internal competen-
cies (Hamel and Prahalad, 1990) or unique differentiation abilities or skills (Porter, 
1985), but strongly influenced by developments in the industry. 
There are, however, several complexities in the explanation. 
First, the industry structure is a far more complex concept as normally accepted. 
Firms in the same industry may not supply substitutable products. In fact, they may sell 
their products to quite different sets of market segments. Since industry data are often 
used to test implications about market behaviour, there are obvious difficulties in doing 
empirical research. 
In our study we also faced a second complexity in defining the industry. 
In the concentrated seed industry the process of strategy formation and implementation 
is done differently by the firms. Some firms conduct highly centralized processes of 
strategyformation, while others prefer highly decentralized patterns of strategic decision-
making. 
Third, the cross border complexity in the industry concept, deserves a clear distinction 
between levels of analysis. In the European market the seed industry should be analyzed 
from a different perspective, compared with the national seed markets. This leaves open 
the question how the dynamics between national and regional markets can be catched, 
using a comprehensive paradigm or theory. 
Fourth, the relationship between structure and strategy still lacks a thorough theoretical 
understanding. The assumed causality between structure of the industry and strategic 
choice behaviour is still based on the Bain theory. From an theoretical point of view it still 
is a challenge for research how to analyze the dynamic character of the relationship be-
tween the two entities. 
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The implications of the findings for practice, are abundant. 
For firms in maturing industries, concentration favours the profitability on the long run, 
after the processes of merger and acquisition. If the entry and exit barriers are high, the 
firms left in the industry, may prosper and use the capital for expansion in new geographi-
cal markets, so broadening their scope. 
However, if the expected profitability will not increase, after the turbulent stage of 
merging and acquisition, the contestability of the industry at large is at stake. 
New firms may enter the industry, exploiting new assets, such as cost advantages, 
higher service levels or quality that better fits the customers. 
In the European seed industry, the profitability of the firms increasingly depend on the 
success by which firms already have entered non-European markets. 
The maturing European market will not offer higher levels of profitability to firms fo-
cusing on that market only. 
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